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Introduction 
This working paper builds on a previous article, Regulating the safe design of plant1 
which discussed the importance of eliminating and controlling risks to health and 
safety ‘at the source’, as early as possible in the life cycle of plant, machinery and 
equipment, in order to overcome OHS problems for those who use, maintain or 
otherwise work with that plant downstream. The earlier article identified some options 
for improving the regulation of safe design under the Australian OHS statutes and 
regulations. These options included establishing the responsibility of all upstream 
parties who have real control and influence over plant safety, to ensure comprehensive 
risk management and compliance with defined OHS outcomes. Proposals also 
emphasised the importance of examining and testing plant (including user trials and 
consultation); technical assessment and design verification of high risk plant by a 
competent, independent third party; and providing quality information to procurers of 
plant, to enable development of safe practices for those who work with that plant. The 
use of files to transfer key, technical information between plant producers, 
independent assessors and regulators was also canvassed, and application of a safe 
design mark as a basis for declaring conformity. 
With these proposals in mind, this working paper explores options for suitable and 
effective enforcement of safe design regulation; that is, for enforcing ‘upstream’ in the 
phases of procurement, design, manufacture, import, supply, installation, erection and 
commissioning of plant.a Enforcement is defined as all dealings between OHS 
regulators and duty holders.2 To date, Australian OHS regulators have, in the main, 
taken an ad hoc approach to enforcing upstream. While it might be argued that there is 
simply a need for more attention to upstream parties by OHS regulators, a crucial 
question is what form such enforcement action should take. The central argument in 
this working paper is that strategies to enforce safe design obligations must take 
account of contextual factors in the operating environment of upstream duty holders 
which impact upon compliance, and that these obligations should be enforced 
‘responsively’, with enforcement mechanisms and strategies that are tailored to the 
level of compliance of duty holders, and using ‘networked’ approaches designed to 
harness key influences upon upstream duty holders. 
Responsive enforcement is an approach increasingly recognised by regulators as 
offering a more credible and optimal enforcement strategy, by incorporating a 
judicious mix of ‘persuasive’ (compliance) and ‘deterrence’ (punishment) 
approaches,3,4,5 rather than relying on either persuasion or deterrence alone. The 
persuasive elements emphasise preventing rather than punishing contraventions of the 
law through information, cooperation, conciliation and negotiation between regulator 
and regulatee. In contrast, deterrence elements involve detecting offenders with 
sufficient frequency and punishing them with sufficient severity so that they will 
perceive that the costs of non-compliance outweigh the perceived benefits, and will 
make greater efforts to comply with the law.6 Two types of deterrence are 
distinguished: specific deterrence where a particular firm is punished for non-
compliance and, as a result, is less likely to repeat the violation; and general 
                                                 
a Note that the Australian OHS statutes do not currently include specific responsibilities in relation to 
procurement or commissioning of plant. 
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deterrence where a population of firms is persuaded to comply by being made aware 
of sanctions against others for non-compliance.7 
Under a responsive approach to enforcement, with an escalating sanctions regime, the 
regulator begins by attempting to persuade the regulatee to comply voluntarily by 
providing guidance (oral or written). If compliance is not forthcoming, the regulator 
escalates the enforcement response through a range of sanctions requiring compliance 
or designed to deter non-compliance. This might include the use of notices, 
enforceable undertakings, restrictions on supplying products or prosecution. In 
essence, responsive enforcement is a dynamic8 approach which involves a chance for 
the regulator to foster cooperative compliance when this is possible, but to move on to 
more demanding requirements and ultimately applying deterrent penalties for 
persistent and serious non-compliance. The rationale for such an approach is that, on 
the one hand, it avoids the problem that enforcement by strong penalties alone may 
produce a culture of regulatory resistance amongst obligation bearers and, on the other 
hand, it reduces the likelihood of non-compliance if regulators permit law breakers to 
go unpunished.9,10 
So, what enforcement mechanisms and strategies might be applied, responsively, to 
enhance OHS outcomes upstream? This working paper begins by discussing current 
mechanisms, strategies and practices applied by Australian OHS regulators to enforce 
compliance with OHS law, observing that, in the main, OHS enforcement policy and 
practice has been designed for and applied to employer and worker duty holders. 
While some of these approaches may have application in enforcing upstream duties, 
there is a need to rethink enforcement in relation to safe design and the upstream 
obligations. Thus, this working paper proposes some possible new directions for 
enforcement policy and practice, taking account of important contextual factors which 
influence upstream duty holders and therefore need to shape how OHS regulators 
oversee and engage with upstream parties. 
Current Approaches to Promoting and Enforcing OHS Compliance 
Persuasion and guidance 
Fostering compliance through persuasion (information, cooperation, conciliation and 
negotiation) is a central element of contemporary Australian OHS enforcement policy 
and practice. For OHS regulators persuasion typically involves awareness raising, and 
production and dissemination of guidance or information. At a wider community level 
persuasion may involve mass media campaigns although, to date, such campaigns 
have focused on the role of employers and workers in addressing OHS ‘in the 
workplace’, rather than the interface with designers, manufacturers and other 
upstream parties. Information and guidance is provided in both print and electronic 
forms (via the world wide web),11,12 typically summarising legal obligations in a fairly 
general manner or issuing hazard alerts in response to incidents.13,14,b OHS regulators 
may also provide education and training programs (or work with third parties such as 
OHS consultants or industry associations to provide these), although training of 
upstream parties has been minimal. 
                                                 
b The websites of Australian OHS authorities provide hazard alerts and other guidance (see 
http://www.nohsc.gov.au/OtherRelatedSites). 
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Regulators may also engage in face-to-face discussion with duty holders. However, in 
recent years there has been a move away from Australian OHS inspectors providing 
specific advice about how to resolve OHS problems, to any duty holders.15 Indeed, 
this is part of a much wider trend as in many countries inspectorates do not have the 
resources or detailed knowledge to act as advisers.16 For all of these reasons, under 
current arrangements, all duty holders must determine for themselves what laws exist 
in this area and how to comply, or track down suitable outside expertise to advise 
them on these matters. 
Nonetheless, OHS regulators have a vital part to play in promoting understanding of 
the role of different parties in ensuring safe design and construction of plant, and in 
promulgating and developing understanding of specific legal obligations. There is a 
challenge to consider how persuasion and guidance initiatives can be designed to 
foster genuine improvements in OHS upstream. There is a danger that broad 
awareness raising campaigns, or guidance briefly summarising legislation or the risk 
management process, will not sufficiently enlighten upstream parties about their role. 
In particular, such a generic approach is unlikely to foster the comprehensive 
identification and elimination or control of specific hazards that is needed to ensure 
that plant, from the earliest phases of its life, is safe for those who will ultimately use, 
operate, maintain or otherwise work it. 
Developing a deeper understanding of addressing OHS at source requires, as 
discussed in the article Regulating the safe design of plant,17 more direction to duty 
holders who are not fully attuned to the ways in which their decisions impact on OHS 
and may overlook key risks. That article proposed a shift in the style of OHS 
regulations to prescribe essential health and safety requirements, in the form of 
precisely defined performance outcomes, as one strategy for providing greater focus 
and direction about OHS problems requiring attention and OHS outcomes to be 
achieved. Such essential requirements can then become the basis for more informative 
guidance materials or checklists to prompt upstream parties to address specific 
hazards. A complementary approach is to make greater use of technical standards as 
one means of addressing specific problems in plant design and construction. These 
strategies are a means of providing more specific guidance to a wider range of 
upstream parties. 
Alternatively, there are more intensive ways of engaging with upstream parties to 
ensure that OHS problems are comprehensively defined and OHS outcomes achieved 
with particular types of plant. Some proactive projects of this type have been 
undertaken by OHS regulators pursuing OHS problems upstream, in high risk 
industries. Examples include the design of equipment used for sheep shearing and 
crutching (NSW WorkCover), transport vehicles and horticultural equipment (SA 
WorkCover), health and aged care equipment, and forklifts (Victorian 
WorkCover).18,19 Such activities typically involve a more in-depth way of working 
with duty holders. These industry-based projects provide the kernel of a new approach 
to engaging with upstream duty holders. Some ways of refining and extending this 
approach are discussed later in this paper, in the section Focused interventions. 
Inspection 
As well as some proactive projects, the day-to-day work of OHS inspectors primarily 
involves inspection and associated follow-up. This includes observation of 
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workplaces, the work environment, plant, substances and work practices as well as 
documentation of procedures, action taken to address OHS matters, and so on. It 
might also include auditing of systematic OHS management. Inspectors’ work is 
underpinned by a range of powers including entry to premises, powers to investigate, 
and access to records and other documentation.20 These powers may be applied in 
inspections in relation to any of the statutory obligations, including upstream ones. 
Inspections may be conducted on an ad hoc basis (for example in response to a 
complaint or an inspector working his/her way through workplaces in a particular 
locality), although increasingly OHS regulators are targeting their inspection work. 
With the principal focus of inspections being ‘workplace’ health and safety, the 
emphasis (especially with limited inspectorate resources) tends to be matters 
concerning the roles of employers and workers, rather than problems that arise 
‘outside the workplace’ with a designer, manufacturer, supplier, importer or other 
upstream party. However, in the process of inspecting workplace health and safety, 
problems may be identified relating to unsafe design or construction and these issues 
may be raised with upstream duty holder(s). 
There is a challenge for OHS regulators to tailor their inspections to assess attention 
to OHS upstream. The focus of such inspections, their timing and the basis for 
targeting are important considerations. 
The focus of upstream inspections 
Inspections with upstream parties might inquire into how prescribed processes are 
carried out (such as hazard identification, risk assessment and control, information 
provision, testing and examination), or they might check relevant documentation of 
these. The rationale for this approach is that systematic processes, and how well they 
are carried out, is an indication of a firm’s arrangements for addressing OHS on an 
ongoing basis. However, there is cause for concern that even if hazard identification 
and risk assessment are undertaken, action in relation to risk control may still be 
inadequate. Moreover, safety information may be developed and provided but it is the 
quality of this that really matters. As such, processes do not necessarily reflect OHS 
outcomes and ultimately these are the most critical concern. Uncontrolled or 
inadequately controlled risks, or poor quality information, indicate weaknesses in 
attention to OHS upstream, which need to be uncovered and are best addressed by 
both dealing with the specific OHS problem and identifying how the firm’s capacity 
and commitment to address OHS effectively needs to be developed in the future. 
As discussed, the article Regulating the safe design of plant21 proposed that OHS 
regulations for plant should incorporate essential health and safety requirements. As 
well as offering some direction to upstream duty holders, this approach would also 
provide a valuable mechanism for focusing inspections, of plant designs and plant 
itself, on key hazards to be addressed upstream, and outcomes to be achieved in 
relation to hazard elimination or control, the content and quality of product safety 
information, and the nature of testing and examination of plant. 
In addition to enhancing inspection upstream by focusing on essential requirements 
for plant, the regulator’s involvement with employers can also be designed to 
reinforce the need for procurement practices that influence OHS action upstream. 
Employers, especially larger ones, are in a position to influence the OHS practices of 
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their suppliers and contractors, who are generally responsive as their survival depends 
on maintaining the business relationship. This supply chain pressure can be fostered 
by employers and, when necessary inspectors, ensuring that OHS is effectively 
addressed in procurement procedures. In order to raise the profile of safe design, 
procurement should be a core focus of inspectors' audits of OHS management 
systems, ensuring that employers, as procurers, require attention to OHS by their 
suppliers. For example, this could include inspecting purchasing procedures, contracts 
procuring specific items, design briefs and tender documents to ensure that they 
specify OHS requirements. A focus on risk management in procurement also provides 
a basis for employers (and inspectors) to trace OHS problems upstream and follow 
these through with the responsible firms. 
 Timing of upstream inspections 
Ideally, inspections will be proactive, and not only follow upstream after an injury has 
occurred. This means aiming inspections as early as possible in a product's life cycle. 
However, there are questions to resolve about the timing of inspections aimed at 
identifying non-compliance. For example, can the duty to ensure safe design be 
judged during the design phase or is it necessary, and/or more useful, to wait until the 
plant is manufactured? Or until it is actually placed on the market? Or until it is in 
use? To some extent these are abstract questions as in many cases plant of the same or 
similar type, from the same designer/manufacturer/importer/supplier will be both in 
development and in production, as well as in circulation or use, because the 
‘producer’ has been involved in making plant of this type for a period of time. Thus 
enforcement can generally be informed by experience with an existing product range, 
without having to wait until injury occurs. 
 Targeting upstream inspections 
Approaches to targeting currently employed by OHS regulators typically involve 
identifying priority organisations by OHS performance, usually judged by workers’ 
compensation claims experience, or by the high risk nature of an industry or the work 
performed. 22,23 Causes of occupational fatalities may also be targeted. Analysis of 
workers’ compensation and fatalities data has revealed that poor design factors are a 
key source of death and serious injury.24 This provides justification for the allocation 
of resources to proactive enforcement with upstream parties. However, these data 
reflect past, rather than current or future OHS problems and typically lack detailed 
information about design problems. Alternative or at least supplementary data sources 
are therefore needed. Some alternative ways of identifying priorities or targets for 
upstream inspection are canvassed in the section Establishing priorities and working 
within industries, later in this paper. 
Whatever arrangements are used, enforcement priorities should not be determined on 
criteria such as ease of accessing the target group. For example, local manufacturers 
may be easier to identify than importers. Equivalent problems should receive 
equivalent attention, whether they originate locally, interstate or are imported from 
overseas. Ideally, targeting would be based on criteria of severity of risk. However, in 
situations where lack of specific information about plant, or firms producing or 
supplying it, precludes this a program of engagement with a randomly selected group 
of firms, and promotion of this activity, amongst a wider group, has merit. This 
approach is discussed further in the section Plant surveillance, later in this paper. 
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A final point to make about inspections is that an additional form of action, to 
supplement and reinforce limited inspectoral resources, is for OHS regulators to 
develop strategies to require self-inspection or self-audit by firms.25 These methods 
have the potential to assist duty holders to ‘learn how to comply’ and to ‘self-
regulate’. The approach may also include reporting the outcomes of inspection to the 
regulator as part of a process of monitoring improvements in action taken to address 
OHS upstream. 
Investigation 
Investigations are generally carried out when a significant incident occurs involving a 
fatality, serious injury or another high risk situation, which may not involve injury, 
such as collapse or overturning of high risk plant. The process of investigation may 
identify problems relating to unsafe design or construction and the matter may be 
addressed with an upstream duty holder. 
A weakness of current practice is that upstream factors are not routinely investigated 
and pursued. A further weakness is the orientation to significant incidents. The goal of 
enforcement in relation to upstream duties should be to prevent plant that is unsafe in 
its design or construction from being placed on the market or being put into use, or to 
seek its modification before injury occurs if the plant is already in use. This demands 
investigation of potentially unsafe plant and follow up action to prevent supply or 
ensure that remedial action is taken. (These matters are discussed further in the section 
Prosecution and penalties below, and further in the section Reforming upstream 
enforcement policy and practice, later in this paper). 
Improvement notices and mechanisms to remedy OHS problems 
The OHS statutes in all jurisdictions provide for an inspector to issue an improvement 
notice.c The notice is a formal direction to remedy a contravention of the Act or 
regulations.26 An improvement notice may be issued to any person responsible for a 
contravention and as such an improvement notice could be issued to a designer, 
manufacturer, importer, supplier or other upstream party. 
However, in practice, notices have rarely been used in relation to upstream 
obligations. In part, this reflects OHS regulators’ emphasis on enforcement of 
employer and worker obligations ‘at the workplace’. However, there are also some 
practical issues that inspectors perceive might impact on the use of notices for 
upstream duties. For example, if an inspector’s notice requires that a particular OHS 
problem be remedied on a particular type of plant, will the inspector need to establish 
that the duty holder has taken steps to resolve the problem on all such items supplied? 
If so, the inspector will need information about customers in order to require that the 
supplier remedies the safety problem on all of these items. This raises questions both 
about how notices should be framed and how to determine when a notice has been 
complied with. Although inspectors might develop strategies to overcome these 
problems, in practice some may favour negotiating with suppliers to modify as much 
of the plant supplied as possible, rather than issuing a notice requiring this. 
A further concern expressed by some inspectors in using notices in relation to design 
or manufacture issues, in particular, is ‘not knowing where we are going to go with 
                                                 
c Under WHSA (Tas) s 38(1) this is not called an improvement notice but the effect is the same. 
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the problem’. That is, identifying a problem with the design or construction of 
particular plant does not mean that the solution is obvious. It may involve some period 
of research and development by duty holders to come up with a solution. Inspectors 
may be sympathetic to this difficulty and prefer to work cooperatively with parties 
that seem willing, rather than imposing a notice which requires a set timeframe for 
compliance. An alternative would be to allow a longer time frame for complying with 
the notice. 
Thus, while there are no legal obstacles to using improvement notices upstream, there 
are some practical issues for OHS regulators to address in operational procedures, to 
clarify how and when such notices are used. There is considerable potential for using 
improvement notices to formalise undertakings made by a duty holder, in negotiation 
with an inspector, as to how and when an OHS problem is to be resolved. However, in 
some situations the best course of action might be to require responsible parties to 
publicise identified OHS problems to procurers and to require that hazardous items 
are recalled or that remedial action is taken on behalf of plant owners who respond to 
the alert. The powers of OHS inspectors do not currently extend to requiring this types 
of action. There is merit in considering legislative amendments to establish a specific 
mechanism to enable and facilitate recall of hazardous plant or component parts, 
restrictions on sale or taking action to modify hazardous plant. Such a mechanism 
exists under the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 (s 65F) which applies to ‘goods’ 
supplied to ‘consumers ’, as defined, but does not extend to all plant used 
occupationally. The supplier could be required to recall goods within a specified 
period, disclose the nature of a defect or dangerous characteristic, provide information 
about the circumstances in which use of the product is dangerous, advise on 
procedures for disposing of the product or issuing an undertaking to repair, replace or 
refund the price of the product. 
Prohibition notices and mechanisms to prevent supply 
Provision is also made, under all of the Australian OHS statutes, for an inspector to 
direct that an activity (or work) ceases if the inspector believes that there is, or is 
likely to be, an immediate risk to health and safety (or an imminent and serious 
risk).27 While, in principle, a prohibition notice could be issued to a designer, 
manufacturer, importer, supplier or other upstream party, in practice such notices have 
rarely been applied in relation to upstream obligations. There are several reasons for 
this. The first is a temporal issue; it may be more difficult to use a prohibition notice 
in the design, manufacture or supply phases as an ‘immediate’ or ‘imminent’ threat to 
health and safety is more likely to arise in end use, and hence prohibiting the unsafe 
situation is less likely to involve an upstream party. However, where plant has been 
supplied in the past, found to be inherently unsafe, and a manufacturer or supplier 
continues to produce or supply that plant for use at work, a direction might be given 
for this to cease. 
A challenge for OHS regulators is whether, and if so how, prohibition notices can be 
used in the context of upstream obligations where a serious danger is identified in the 
design or the construction of plant, but that danger has not yet been realised in end use 
or operation of the plant. Arguably, there is a case to amend the Australian OHS 
statutes to enable prohibition of supply of plant where an inspector is of the opinion 
that the nature of a threat or the degree of risk to health and safety warrants that 
prohibition. Such a mechanism is applied in relation to consumer products under the 
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Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 (TPA: s 65B, 65C and 65E) where the 
responsible Minister may publish a notice in the government Gazette, warning of risks 
and advising of restrictions on supply or use. A mechanism to prohibit supply is 
probably most appropriately applied for unsafe plant that is likely to be supplied in 
some numbers. 
 Infringement notices 
Infringement notices (also known as penalty notices or on-the-spot fines) can be 
issued for offences under OHS legislation in some jurisdictions.d They enable quick 
and easy enforcement28,29 but should be reserved for clear cut, non-complex offences 
where the breach is clearly defined in law and the facts are easily verified.30,31 
Nonetheless, it is still important to optimise the preventive value of these fines and 
there is merit in applying them to matters that have a direct effect on risk control. In 
regard to the upstream phases, this might include, for example, offences such as 
producing plant that emits noise, vibration, hazardous substances or other hazards 
above defined exposure limits. However, it is likely that amendment of OHS 
regulations would be required to incorporate more of this type of clear-cut 
performance outcomes or targets.32 
In determining the most strategic use of infringement notices, a guiding rule is to 
ensure that there is proportionality between the seriousness of the offence and the 
penalty imposed. As such, infringement notices should not be a substitute for 
prosecution in serious or repeat cases of offending. In addition, a mechanism is 
needed to require duty holders to actually resolve the OHS problem giving rise to a 
breach, as once an on-the-spot fine is paid, liability for the offence that is the subject 
of the notice is taken to be discharged. The current practice of some jurisdictions of 
using infringement notices in conjunction with improvement or prohibition notices 
provides a mechanism for requiring the necessary preventive action to rectify specific 
hazards. This approach is equally applicable to requiring preventive action upstream. 
Design verification and registration 
For certain types of plant designated as ‘high risk’, Australian OHS law requires 
verification of the design of the plant. Designs are then registered by the OHS 
regulator to whom documentation is submitted and the registered design is recognised 
by other jurisdictions, under mutual recognition legislation.33 Exactly how design 
verification is done, for what types of plant, whether technical standards are used as a 
benchmark for design verification and, if so, which ones, varies between the 
jurisdictions. However, a point of consistency is the withdrawal of OHS regulators 
from involvement in verification or design approval processes. The article Regulating 
the safe design of plant suggested some changes to the current arrangements to ensure 
independence and competence of those performing design verification, and adoption 
of a list of technical standards to be applied consistently in all jurisdictions.34 The 
possibility was also canvassed of a process of technical assessment of plant, rather 
than verification by reference to documentation, such as design calculations and 
specifications, alone. 
Over and above the arrangements for design verification, there is also a need to 
consider the role of the regulator in responding to documentation submitted for the 
                                                 
d Queensland, New South Wales, Tasmania, Northern Territory and Australian Capital Territory. 
 
10 
 
 
 
purposes of design registration. At one extreme this can be a ‘rubber stamping’ 
exercise where documentation is received by the regulator, the regulator ‘believes 
what they are given’ and a registration number is assigned, without any further 
checking. Another approach involves an OHS regulator’s plant specialists, usually 
engineers, checking calculations on designs submitted, focusing on critical structural 
and mechanical aspects. 
An alternative approach, which has the potential to provide more effective scrutiny, is 
a rigorous program of auditing a randomly selected sample of designs submitted for 
registration, and assessment of the plant itself if it is already constructed. This would 
not simply involve an engineer checking computations against technical standards but 
would require a holistic examination of the plant and its design by a multidisciplinary 
team which, as appropriate to the plant, might include expertise in engineering, 
ergonomics or other specialist areas. Such an audit would go beyond the, albeit 
important, traditional structural and mechanical hazards and would look at noise 
emission, access and egress, electrical safety, chemical safety, ergonomic matters, and 
other essential health and safety aspects of the particular type of plant. 
Rather than a more limited check of documentation for all plant in a particular high 
risk category, auditing a sample of plant designs frees up resources for this more 
rigorous process of examination. However, it is crucial that resources permit audit of a 
sufficiently large sample so that ‘the message gets around’ that the regulator is 
actively checking plant design and construction. In the event that audited plant does 
not meet OHS requirements, the regulator would refuse to provide a registration 
number and could publicise refusals, with reasons, to make other relevant duty 
holders aware that the regulator is taking the auditing role seriously. Since such high 
risk plant cannot be used legally unless it is design registered, the use of that plant 
would effectively be prohibited until such time as it does comply.  
Ideally, thorough verification of designs by competent, independent third parties, 
together with random, rigorous auditing by OHS regulators would prevent unsafe 
plant from entering the market and being put into use in the first place. However, as 
the regulator will not be auditing all designs submitted for notification, it is possible 
that some plant that is not audited may subsequently be found to have design and/or 
construction flaws. Moreover, regulators will not always be able to audit plant before 
it is used; in some cases an audit may be retrospective. A mechanism is therefore 
needed to enable withdrawal of registration if defects are subsequently identified, and 
to alert persons submitting designs to that possibility, at the time of registration. 
Enforceable undertakings 
Enforceable undertakings are included in the Tasmanian, Queensland Australian 
Capital Territory and Commonwealth OHS statutes, although their incorporation is 
quite recent and there is little experience with their use. They are also used for a range 
of offences under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (s 87B), including product 
safety matters. Essentially these provisions empower the regulator to accept from a 
person, a written undertaking about measures they will take to remedy a contravention 
of the relevant law. If the person contravenes any of the terms of the undertaking, a 
court may make appropriate orders which might include directing the person to 
comply, ordering the person to compensate any person who has suffered loss or 
damage as a result of the contravention, or publishing details of the undertaking. 
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Enforceable undertakings could be used to commit firms to organisational reforms to 
address OHS upstream, such as appointing or engaging staff with appropriate OHS 
know-how and capability, to review and improve a design or modify plant, or to 
implement a compliance program to manage OHS obligations. The following example 
of a product safety enforceable undertaking under the Trade Practices Act illustrates 
how such undertakings might be used. An importer of hydraulic trolley jacks was 
required to commit the firm, by enforceable undertaking, to not supply products that 
did not comply with mandatory consumer product safety standards for such jacks and 
to design, implement, maintain and audit a compliance program. The latter was to 
include embedding a culture of compliance in the company and developing systems to 
eliminate or minimise the possibility of trade practices contraventions.35 To have 
‘teeth’ such undertakings must be underpinned by arrangements for independent 
review or audit,36,37 in order to determine whether they are complied with properly 
and that the desired outcomes are achieved in regard to plant design and construction. 
Prosecution and penalties 
Prosecutions are the mechanism for imposing potentially larger sanctions as well as 
the stigma of criminal penalties. Proceedings may be initiated against any duty holder 
for breach of an obligation under the OHS statutes or regulations. However, in 
practice, upstream parties have seldom been prosecuted in Australia. 
There are several reasons for this. First, prosecutions are still largely brought in 
response to serious injuries and fatalities. This ‘event focus’ means, in relation to 
plant, that the matters investigated tend to involve machinery and equipment that has 
been in use for some years. Quite apart from practical difficulties of gathering 
evidence in relation to plant produced some years previously, it is also possible that 
the plant was designed, made and supplied in the era of previous legislation and/or the 
time period for initiating a prosecution, if applicable, may have expired. Second, the 
‘workplace’ focus of OHS enforcement means that amongst those prosecutions that 
do involve an upstream obligation, it may be an employer who has designed, made or 
modified plant for use in the employer’s workplace that is prosecuted. 
If, instead of an event focus, OHS regulators ensure that the criteria for launching a 
prosecution are severity of the risk, regardless of whether death or injury has 
occurred, and investigate the sources of OHS risks upstream, this approach will open 
up more possibilities for prosecuting upstream offences, if the severity of the 
contravention warrants it. Such prosecutions should be targeted at the individuals or 
organisational entities with real control and responsibility for the contravention. 
However, a commitment to launch prosecutions upstream by criteria of risk will not 
resolve all problems. There are jurisdictional reasons why prosecutions (and other 
enforcement mechanisms such as notices) are not pursued. In some jurisdictions it is 
not possible to initiate action under the jurisdiction’s OHS statute against a party who 
is located outside of that jurisdiction. While it is likely that this will continue to be a 
problem for plant imported from overseas, the current problems experienced in some 
Australian jurisdictions, in relation to plant that is simply crossing a border within this 
country do need to be addressed, by legislative amendment if necessary. For example, 
if a designer or manufacturer, located interstate, is responsible for producing unsafe 
plant, the OHS regulator in the jurisdiction into which the plant is supplied should not 
be limited to taking action against a supplier within the state or an employer who 
 
12 
 
 
 
purchases the plant. Action at the source, against a designer or manufacturer, should 
be possible. 
Another problem concerns the wording of the OHS statutes. The qualification ‘when 
properly used’ applies under all of the Australian OHS statutes, although the South 
Australian statute requires duty holders to take account of reasonably foreseeable 
forms of misuse. In other jurisdictions, incorporation in the duty of the expression 
‘when properly used’ could mean that it is possible, in at least some instances, to 
design, make and supply plant that has inherent risks, and to rely on instructions and 
warnings about the risks as the sole precaution. This is most clearly the case under the 
Victorian OHS Act (s 24(4)), which provides that plant is not to be regarded as 
properly used where it is used without regard to relevant or appropriate information or 
advice about its use. There is clearly a need to amend the Victorian OHS statute in 
view of the court’s interpretation of ‘when properly used’ in the unsuccessful 
Victorian prosecutions for supply of unsafe plant. (See Herless Pty Ltd v Barnes 
[1986] Industrial Relations Commission of Victoria in Court Session, Garlick AP, 
case no 12/1986, 26 September 1986 (unreported); and Victorian WorkCover 
Authority v Chem-Mak Pty Ltd [1999], Melbourne County Court, 1999 (unreported). 
However, the expression ‘when properly used’ this appears to be less of a problem in 
some other jurisdictions. In WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector 
Mulder) v Arbor Products International (Australia) Pty Ltd [2001], 105 IR 81, the 
Industrial Relations Commission (in full session, on appeal) concluded that the 
qualification ‘when properly used’ is intended to limit the liability of a supplier where 
the plant which is supplied is safe. In this specific case, the onus was on the supplier 
of a wood chipping machine to ensure that the plant was inherently safe before any 
argument about whether the plant was properly used could be raised, rather than 
relying on the provision of information in a manual or training of the customer’s 
employees. Other subsequent cases in NSW and Western Australia have made a 
similar interpretation. (See Shepherd v Viticulture Technologies (Aust) Pty Ltd, Court 
of Petty Sessions, Albany, WA, 2003 (unreported); National Hire Pty Ltd v Howard [ 
2003] NSWIRComm 144 at para 5; and Inspector Wilkie v Kennards Hire Pty Limited 
[2004] NSWIRComm 167 at para 25). 
In the event that a prosecution is pursued against an upstream duty holder and is 
successful, a further weakness of the current regime is that the penalties established 
under the OHS statutes vary quite widely. Until recently the highest penalties 
available were in NSW where the penalty for a first offence is up to $550,000 for a 
corporation or $55,000 for an individual (or up to $825,000 for a corporation and 
$82,500 for an individual, for a second offence). However, recent amendments to the 
ACT OHS statute (sections 35C to 35E) establish a maximum penalty of $750,000 for 
a corporation ($150,000 for an individual), where an OHS offence exposes a person to 
a substantial risk of serious harm and the person was reckless or negligent; or $1 
million ($200,000 for an individual) where a breach of the duty results in serious harm 
to a person and the duty holder was reckless or negligent.The lowest penalty for 
breaches of upstream duties is $100,000 under the South Australian and Western 
Australian OHS statutes. 
Moreover, quite apart from the level of the penalty, there are criticisms of the fine 
itself as a sanction.38 A monetary fine may signal to offenders that offences are 
‘purchasable commodities’ rather than activities or omissions judged by the state to be 
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intolerable. Fines do not require the offender to investigate the reasons for the 
contravention, to discipline those responsible, or directly to review and remedy the 
defects in their management of OHS. Thus there is a case for exploring alternative 
penalties. Gunningham and Johnstone39 propose that these penalties might include 
court-ordered publicity of the outcomes of prosecution; supervisory orders and 
corporate probation requiring an organisation to investigate the contravention, 
discipline those responsible, and return a compliance report to the court; 
organisational reform orders requiring the organisation to report regularly to the court 
on its efforts to develop a compliance program and reform management of OHS; 
punitive injunctions requiring the organisation to introduce specific arrangements to 
manage OHS; community service orders requiring duty holders to carry out an OHS-
related project using the organisation’s resources; and dissolution of the most 
egregious offenders. Some alternative penalties are established under the New South 
Wales OHS statute which enables the court to order publicity or notify certain persons 
about an offence (OHSA (NSW): s115) or to require an offender to undertake 
specified projects for the general improvement of OHS (OHSA (NSW): s 116). 
In summary, prosecution has rarely been pursued with upstream duty holders, 
although some jurisdictions have taken action in this area. The problems identified 
here will need attention if prosecution is to be used strategically, consistently and 
fairly in relation to upstream offences. 
 More of the same or new directions? 
In discussing the various options available to OHS regulators I have emphasised that 
these mechanisms have rarely been applied in relation to upstream obligations. 
Fundamentally, there is a need for a greater focus by Australian OHS regulators on 
upstream parties, consistent with the Australian Workplace Relations Ministers’ 
Council commitment, as made in The National OHS Strategy 2002–2012,40 to 
eliminate hazards at the design stage. There is a need for awareness raising that alerts 
upstream parties to their obligations, and guidance that informs and develops their 
understanding. There is a need to target inspection upstream, applying criteria relevant 
to an upstream focus, as distinct from the current ‘workplace’ focus. Existing 
improvement, prohibition and infringement notices have application upstream but 
OHS regulators need to determine, strategically, how and when they are applied. 
Notices may need to be supplemented with mechanisms to facilitate recall, remedial 
action and prohibition of supply. More rigorous scrutiny is needed of designated high 
risk plant, before registration of design and use. And strategic use of prosecution 
should be a realistic possibility, with jurisdictional constraints resolved and consistent 
penalties applied. This paper has proposed some ways in which these mechanisms 
could be enhanced to facilitate enforcement upstream. 
Moreover, as upstream enforcement has, to date, largely been ad hoc with a limited 
number of proactive projects undertaken by Australian OHS regulators, an explicit 
commitment to address upstream obligations is an important first step in reforming the 
enforcement policies of the OHS regulators. Only some authorities currently do this. 
Over-committed inspectors with performance targets in other areas are unlikely to be 
able to find or make the time to pursue issues upstream unless safe design and 
construction is a genuine priority. An upstream focus will need to become part of the 
planned and agreed priorities of OHS regulators if it is to receive proper attention. 
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However, ‘tidying up’ available enforcement mechanisms and applying them 
upstream more often is not all that is needed. These mechanisms, as refined, will need 
to be applied within the framework a new, strategic and responsive approach to 
enforcement upstream in which enforcement is tailored to the level of compliance of 
particular duty holders. The following section canvasses some possible new 
directions. 
 
Reforming Upstream Enforcement Policy and Practice 
 Enforcement in context – creating conditions for self-regulation 
In developing new ways to enforce OHS upstream, it is crucial to take account of 
contextual issues in the operating environment of firms involved in design, 
manufacture, import or supply, or other upstream functions. It is also essential that 
enforcement strategies are tailored to the nature of upstream obligations. Engaging 
with one firm that produces or supplies plant that is identified as unsafe, negotiating to 
redesign or modify the plant, possibly even prosecuting, and hoping for specific 
deterrence with that firm, and/or more general deterrence by publicity of the action 
taken and production of hazard alerts, is unlikely to be effective in achieving change. 
This is not only because this approach involves dealing with one problem at a time, it 
is also because the capacity to self-regulate in the area of OHS is considerably 
influenced by ‘external forces’, which include end customer requirements relating to 
function and operability of plant, requirements of a distributor or other supplier, the 
price ‘that the market will bear’, and the extent to which the plant supplied is a core 
product that the business is based upon. 
Thus, for firms to be motivated to address OHS upstream, there is a need for an 
enforced level playing field. Without this, firms may do less in order to keep a product 
sellable (with regard to cost and function). Even firms experiencing specific 
deterrence action by OHS regulators may be unwilling to take the necessary steps to 
make a product safe, if they are aware that other plant of the same type (from other 
manufacturers, importers or suppliers) is not the subject of enforcement action. 
Alternatively, they may develop safety solutions or modifications as an optional extra 
or choice within the product range, while keeping a less safe but more saleable 
product on the market. In short, market forces prevail and if OHS is to be taken 
seriously, consistent intervention is required for particular types of plant. This might 
include OHS regulators engaging with producers, importers and suppliers of that 
plant, as well as influential procurers, in order to establish a ‘level playing field’ for 
preventive action. 
In the operating environment of plant producers and suppliers there is a paradox that 
regulation (including enforcement), applied consistently, can create conditions for 
more effective self-regulation by firms. Without it, the capacity of firms to self-
regulate in the interests of OHS is constrained by their competitors (including local 
producers and importers), and by the demands of procurers or others in the supply 
chain. All of this suggests the need for a different approach to enforcement that 
involves ‘action across the board’ as distinct from enforcement action focused on 
individual firms, one at a time. 
 Establishing priorities and working within industries 
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A discussion of enforcement upstream can also not ignore the reality that Australian 
OHS regulators have limited resources. It is inevitable that such enforcement effort 
will need to be targeted in some way. Currently, workers’ compensation claims data is 
the predominant source of information used by OHS regulators for targeting. To some 
extent this might also be used to examine injury causation upstream, especially if 
comprehensive text fields in claims records enable regulators to determine underlying 
factors that contribute to injuries. But even with better data collection it is still likely 
that only where plant of a particular type is produced and supplied in large numbers, 
with design or construction flaws that give rise to consistent types of incidents (such 
as such instability of forklifts causing vehicles to tip over, or absence of guarding on 
augers causing injuries in maintenance or cleaning),41,42 that clear priorities for 
upstream enforcement action will be revealed through analysis of claims data. 
Thus alternative methods are needed to identify priority areas for attention. Some 
possibilities lie in the fact that most Australian OHS regulators now plan and organise 
their field inspection services in industry programs. This industry focus provides 
opportunities for identifying ‘upstream’ problem areas through hazard surveillance 
initiatives conducted as part of planned and systematic inspections, development of 
industry knowledge of problem areas by field staff, and consultation with employers, 
unions, plant producers and suppliers to the industry. Voluntary notification of unsafe 
plant, by workplace purchasers and users, can also be encouraged to assist in 
identifying plant designed, manufactured or supplied in an unsafe condition. Ideally, 
the criteria for the regulator selecting plant to target for upstream enforcement would 
be based principally on the hazards present and the potential severity of injury or 
illness that could arise. Importantly, priorities identified through this approach need 
not be confined to mass produced plant, but could extend to custom made plant within 
certain categories of machinery and equipment that is widely used in an industry; for 
example food handling, processing and cooking systems used in the food industry. 
The virtue of industry programs is that more in-depth knowledge can be developed 
about OHS problems affecting the industry. The ‘down side’, with the current 
structure and practice of OHS regulators’ industry programs, is that pursuing OHS 
problems upstream can mean identifying a problem in one industry program and then 
‘handing it over’ to another industry program to follow through. For example, unsafe 
machinery identified by inspectors working in the hospitality industry might need to 
be followed up by the manufacturing industry program if the OHS problem arises in 
manufacture of the plant, or by the transport and storage industry program if the 
problem involves importers or suppliers. Thus an inspector with the initiative and 
interest to pursue an issue upstream must then ‘let it go’ to be taken up by the 
‘correct’ industry program in the regulator’s structure. 
Critical to the approach proposed here is working with key players within industry 
programs and not transferring between them. The key is that the ‘problem plant’ is 
procured and used within that industry. This approach provides continuity in 
following an issue through, makes efficient use of staff resources rather than 
involving multiple staff from different teams in the same issue, and overcomes the 
problem of a second industry team giving less priority to an issue as it is not within 
their performance targets. 
 Tailor-made, networked strategies 
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Most crucial is the opportunity that working upstream, within an industry program, 
provides for bringing together a cross-section of parties. This both establishes the 
necessary level playing field by working ‘across the board’ with relevant duty holders 
and fosters supply chain influences as procurers, producers and suppliers must interact 
in seeking acceptable solutions to OHS problems. The relevant parties should be 
identified, case-by-case, on the basis of targeting those with real control and 
influence. This might include plant owners and potential procurers, designers, 
manufacturers, importers or suppliers, those installing or erecting the plant, and so on. 
As appropriate to the strategy it might also involve relevant industry and trade 
associations, unions and other potentially influential parties. The aim is to establish an 
effective ‘network’ of information and influences that operates at least state-wide, 
preferably across Australia and, if possible, reaches to overseas sources. Thus it is no 
longer possible or acceptable for some producers, importers or suppliers to under-cut 
others. This network will be different for different types of plant, and the different 
industries in which it is procured and used. 
The challenge then is to tailor enforcement strategies to the type of plant and the 
relevant ‘players’. Applying principles of responsive enforcement, strategies should 
encompass elements that encourage and persuade those responsible to address safe 
design but enable escalation of the enforcement response to provide an effective 
deterrent when required. As discussed, Australian OHS regulators have a number of 
mechanisms at their disposal, to reinforce advice and inspection with notices of 
various kinds, refusing to register and/or withdrawing registration (for designated high 
risk plant), enforceable undertakings (in four jurisdictions), and prosecution and 
imposition of penalties when warranted. 
In working across the board to tackle OHS problems upstream, within industry 
programs, two distinct types of approaches can be identified. The first involves 
conducting more generalised surveillance of plant and the second involves specifically 
focused interventions. 
 Plant surveillance 
Plant surveillance is a strategy that might be applied if either the group of potential 
duty holders is large or the regulator is uncertain about the extent of compliance with 
OHS requirements for a category of plant. The approach involves communication 
with a wider group of potential duty holders, advising them of their legal obligations 
and that they might be required to provide evidence of compliance in a follow-up 
contact. Self-inspection or self-audit tools might be provided to assist firms to ‘self-
regulate’ or ‘learn how to comply’ and, if useful, firms could be asked to report to the 
regulator the results of their self-audits/inspection. A randomly selected sample of the 
total set of firms involved is then contacted by the regulator to verify that products 
placed on the market conform to requirements and to require remedial action if this is 
not the case. 
Although follow-up only occurs with a sample of duty holders, surveillance in relation 
to particular plant can have a wider impact because the whole population of duty 
holders at least receives information about their obligations and is advised of the need 
to act on this. This guidance and persuasion element is reinforced by awareness, 
through publicity by the regulator and informal communication within industry 
networks, of the genuine possibility of further contact from and action by the 
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regulator. That is, through informal communication with procurers and other 
suppliers, or advice from industry or trade associations (and so on), duty holders are 
aware that there is follow-up with others and they too may be contacted by the 
regulator. 
An example of this approach is applied by the Swedish Working Environment 
Authority43  which sends a bulletin to all firms supplying particular machinery or 
equipment. Firms are referred to the Authority’s website which has information 
about machinery safety and requirements relating to specific plant. This 
communication is targeted to suppliers of one type of plant such as pressure vessels, 
earth moving machinery, power presses, dough mixers, and so on. Some of the firms 
are then contacted and asked for instructions for safe use of the plant, technical 
information about their product and personnel from the Work Environment Authority 
may also visit a firm to examine products and documents. 
 Focused interventions 
Focused interventions can be applied when an OHS problem is known. They involve 
working with a cross-section (network) of parties in the supply chain and market place 
for particular plant. Those producing or supplying a particular type of plant, as well as 
influential procurers are engaged. This includes those complying as well as those that 
may not be; the rationale for this being that compliant firms have a vested interest in 
levelling the playing field and can help to reinforce the need for action by others. 
Interventions involve working with relevant parties to define precisely the nature of 
the OHS problem requiring attention, to explain why it is a problem, to jointly 
determine the OHS outcomes required and to identify (if necessary) what is not going 
to be an acceptable solution. The OHS outcomes need not be in the form of specific 
control measures as innovation is encouraged. Hence the fundamental concern is that 
the required performance outcome(s) must be clear; for example, ensuring that access 
to particular danger zones on wood working machines is prevented or requiring 
attention to ergonomic aspects of the design of certain power tools. Once OHS 
performance outcomes are determined, the relevant parties are asked to ‘sign onto’ 
those outcomes. 
In this approach the OHS regulator is doing more than simply advising ‘here is a 
problem, you fix it’ but nor is the regulator providing specific direction or solutions. 
The approach is more one of ensuring that duty holders are left in no doubt about 
what they are trying to achieve; giving them something to work with. The regulator 
might commission independent research or technical assessment to assist in clarifying 
the OHS problem to be resolved. For example, Worksafe Victoria funded Monash 
University’s Accident Research Centre (MUARC) to assess the dynamic stability of 
industrial fork lift trucks, revealing problems with stability, speed and braking 
distances, indicating that fork lifts operate ‘close to the edge’ at all times, with no 
margin for safety.44,45 The regulator might also gather evidence from industry sources 
and experience. However, it is the relevant duty holders that must determine specific 
solutions to the problem(s), with the regulator being open to different possible 
solutions and keeping the option open for further research and development. Working 
with end users to develop solutions should also be built into the process. 
For duty holders who do not commit themselves by seeking and implementing 
solutions that meet defined performance outcomes, then responsive enforcement 
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comes into play. Again this might involve the use of inspectors’ notices, requirements 
to recall and/or take remedial action on unsafe plant, prohibition or restriction of 
supply on unsafe items, enforceable undertakings (where applicable) or prosecution, 
where warranted. 
Compared to conventional enforcement practices which draw a very long bow in 
hoping to ‘set an example’ and motivate other duty holders to comply by prosecuting 
one firm and publicising the outcome, the network of information and influences 
encouraged by working across the board with a range of parties, as relevant to 
particular plant, increases the potential for compliance. First, it reduces the risk that 
non-compliant firms will undercut would-be compliant firms, leading the latter to 
lower their standards to stay in the market place. Second, it helps to ensure that when 
notices, prosecution or other enforcement mechanisms are pursued with particular 
firms, because they have not responded to guidance and persuasion, that this action 
will be ‘heard about’ by relevant parties in the industry. Thus, specific deterrence with 
individual firms has a greater chance of achieving more general deterrence, in the 
context of focused, networked interventions. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, while a range of upstream parties have had obligations in relation to 
plant for some years under the Australian OHS statutes and regulations, the 
enforcement policies and practice of OHS regulators are principally focused on 
employers and workers, ‘at the workplace’. While there is a range of enforcement 
mechanisms that might be applied upstream, working effectively to improve OHS 
outcomes in design, manufacture, import, supply and other upstream phases will 
require more than simply making greater use of these mechanisms, on an ad hoc basis, 
with individual firms, in response to incidents involving unsafe plant. There is a need 
to rethink enforcement policy and practice, tailoring strategies to suit the operating 
environment upstream. 
This paper has suggested some ways forward but these do not represent an exhaustive 
set of possibilities. In identifying and developing other approaches to enforcement 
upstream, two elements are fundamental. The first element is the need to harness the 
network of influences operating in the supply chain and market place for particular 
plant. This is crucial both to create a level playing field and so that duty holders are 
influenced to address OHS by those that they do business with, day-to-day. The 
second element is the importance of responsive enforcement. This starts by providing 
support for compliance through guidance about legal obligations, the nature of OHS 
problems to be addressed and performance outcomes to be achieved. Where action is 
not taken voluntarily to achieve the required outcomes, the enforcement response is 
stepped up through the range of mechanisms available. 
 
19 
 
 
 
 20 
 
 
 
                                                
 
 
References 
1.  Bluff, E. Regulating the safe design of plant. Journal of Occupational Health 
and Safety, Australia and New Zealand 2004, 20(3): 229-239. 
2  Health and Safety Commission. Enforcement policy statement. London: Health 
and Safety Executive, 2002, p 3. 
3.  Ayres, I and Braithwaite, J. Responsive regulation. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1992, pp 35-41. 
4.  Kagan, R. Regulatory enforcement. In Rosenbloom, D and Schwartz, R (eds). 
Handbook of regulation and administrative law. New York: Dekker, 1994. 
5.  Gunningham, N and Johnstone, R. Regulating workplace safety: systems and 
sanctions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, chapter 4. 
6.  Johnstone, R. From fiction to fact - rethinking OHS enforcement. Working 
paper 11, National Research Centre for OHS Regulation. Canberra: Australian 
National University, 2003, pp. 10-20. 
7.  Akers, R. Criminological theories, 2nd ed. Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing 
Company, 1996. 
8. Braithwaite, J. Restorative justice and responsive regulation. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002, p 30. 
9.  Gunningham and Johnstone, op cit, p 112. 
10.  Shapiro, S. and Rabinowitz, R. Punishment versus cooperation in regulatory 
enforcement: a case study of OSHA. Administrative Law Review, 1997, 14 (4): 713-
762. 
11.  Victorian WorkCover Authority. Health and safety compliance and enforcement 
policy. Melbourne: Victorian WorkCover Authority 2002, p 5. 
12.  NSW WorkCover Authority. Compliance policy and prosecution guidelines. 
Sydney: NSW WorkCover Authority, 2004a, p 7. 
13.  Workplace Services Safer at the source. Series of pamphlets for upstream duty 
holders. Adelaide: Workplace Services, 2000. 
14.  NSW WorkCover Authority. Frequently asked questions – plant. Sydney: NSW 
WorkCover Authority. Accessed online on June 2004b, at 
http://www.workcover.nsw.gov.au. 
15. Maxwell, C. Occupational health and safety review. Melbourne: State of 
Victoria, 2004, p 259. 
16.  Von Richthofen, W. Labour inspection. A guide to the profession. Geneva: 
International Labour Organisation, 2002, p 205. 
17.  Bluff, op cit, pp 232-233. 
18.  Cowley, S, Culvenor, J and Knowles, J. Safe design project. Review of literature 
and review of initiatives of OHS authorities and other key players. Sydney: National 
Occupational Health and Safety Commission, 2000, pp 17- 22. 
 21 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
19.  Larsson, T et al. Industrial forklift trucks – dynamic stability and the design of 
safe logistics. Safety Science Monitor, 2003, 7 (1): 1-14. 
20.  Johnstone, R. Occupational health and safety law and policy. Text and 
materials. Sydney: Thomson, Law Book Company, 2004, pp 383-391. 
21.  Bluff, op cit, p 233. 
22.  Victorian WorkCover Authority, op cit, p 8. 
23.  NSW WorkCover Authority 2004a, op cit, p 12. 
24. NOHSC. The role of design issues in work-related injuries in Australia 1997-
2002. Canberra: National Occupational Health and Safety Commission, 2004. 
25.  Gunningham, N and Sinclair, D. Leaders and laggards: next generation 
environmental regulation. Sheffield: Greenleaf Publishing, 2002, pp 18-21. 
26.  Johnstone 2004, op cit, pp 406-410. 
27.  Ibid, pp 406-410. 
28.  Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC). Securing compliance. Civil and 
administrative penalties in Australian federal legislation, Discussion Paper 65. 
Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2003, pp 395-398. 
29.  Bluff, E. and Johnstone, R. Infringement notices: stimulus for prevention or 
trivialising offences? Journal of Occupational Health and Safety, Australia and New 
Zealand, 2003, 19(4): 337-346. 
30.  Bluff and Johnstone, op cit. 
31.  Australian Law Reform Commission, op cit, p 418. 
32.  Bluff, R and Gunningham, N. Principle, process, performance or what. New 
approaches to OHS standards setting. Working paper 9, National Research Centre for 
OHS Regulation. Canberra: Australian National University, 2003, pp. 11-12. 
33.  Mutual Recognition Act 1992, Commonwealth of Australia. 
34.  Lynch, S and Russell, B. Resolving cross border issues: inconsistent application 
of the national plant standard. Executive summary. Sydney: Occupational Health and 
Safety Administration Group Working Paper, 6 October, 1998. 
35.  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). Undertaking to 
the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission for the purposes of section 
87B by Golden Sun Pty Ltd. Canberra: ACCC Undertakings Register, 2002. 
36.  Parker, C. Arm twisting, auditing and accountability. What regulators and 
compliance professionals should know about the use of enforceable undertakings to 
promote compliance. Melbourne: presentation to the Australian Compliance Institute, 
28 May, 2003, pp 8-9. 
37.  Parker, C. Regulator-required corporate compliance program audits. Law and 
Policy, 2003, 25(3): 232-234. 
38.  Fisse, B. Individual and corporate criminal responsibility and sanctions against 
corporations. In: Johnstone, R. (ed), Occupational health and safety prosecutions in 
Australia: overview and issues. Melbourne: Centre for Employment and Labour 
Relations Law, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, 1994, pp100-109. 
 22 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
39. Gunningham and Johnstone, op cit, pp 259-277. 
40.  NOHSC. National OHS strategy 2002-2012. Canberra: Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2002. 
41.  Larsson et al, op cit. 
42.  NOHSC. Work-related fatalities associated with design issues involving 
machinery and fixed plant in Australia, 1989 to 1992. Sydney: National Occupational 
Health and Safety Commission, 2000. 
43.  Swedish Working Environment Authority. Scrutiny of products and 
documentation - "market control". Stockholm: Work Environment Authority Unit for 
Machinery and Personal Protective Equipment, 2002. 
44.  Larsson et al, op cit. 
45.  Worksafe Victoria. Forklift safety. Don’t learn it by accident. Melbourne: 
Worksafe Victoria, 2003. 
